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It has  become  accepted  doctrine  among  economists  that  the  rate  of  profit  in  the 
United  States  has  declined  since  the  mid-1960s.  What  L less  a matter  of  agreement 
is whether  this  decline  represents  a stage  in  a long-term  secular  decline.  In  a recent 
article,  Dumeail,  Glick,  and  Range1  ( 1017)  reviewed  the  existing  empirical  evidence 
on  this  topic  and  found  that,  independent  of variation  in  the  definition  of the  rate  of 
profit.  any  series extending  back to  1939 reveals  artable  or  increving  trend.  Although 
two  periods  of serious  decline  exist  (after  World  War  I and  in  the  Iate  196Os), they  are 
connected  by a  ‘leap  forward”  during  World  War  IL In fact,  in any  measure  which  doee 
not  subtract  taxes  from  profit,  World  War II coincides  with  a considerable  restoration 
of the  rate  of  profit.  This  is an  important  anomaly  for  Marxists  who  predict  a iong- 
term  deciining  tendency,  yet  it  ha  never  been  addressed  in  the  empirical  literature 
on  this  topic. 
There  is no  doubt  that  a restoration  of  the  rate  of  profit  discovered  in  the  1940s 
questions  the  relevance  of  Marx’s  famous  the&  of  a falling  tendency  of  the  rate  of 
profit  in  capitalist  economies.  Certainly  when  Mux  discussed  the  tendency  of  the 
rate  of  profit  he  acknowledged  the  important  role  of  countertendencies.  However, 
one  would  not  expect  the  counter  tendencies  which  Marx  discussed  to  have  such  a 
concentrated  impact  over  such  a short  span  of  time. 
The  purpose  of the  present  study  is to investigate  more carefully  this  leap  forward 
in  profitability.  In  a  first  pm,  we  will  fully  explore  the  statistical  characteristics  of 
the  leap  forward.  Specifically,  we  wilI  compare  the  leap  forward  with  earlier  and 
future  fluctuations  and  trends  in  profitability  (an  effort  will  be  made,  in  spite  of  the 
deficiencies  of  the  data.  to  cover  a  period  of  120 years).  We  will  further  determine 
whether  the  leap  forward  is  invariant  to  the  choice  of  the  definition  of  the  rate  of 
profit  or  whether  it  can  be  explained  by  a  specific  choice  of  statistical  categories.  .4 
second  part  will  consider  whether  the  leap  forward  is the  expression  of  changes  in  the 
relative  price  of  fured  capital,  or  a  variation  in  the  workweek  of  capital.  The  final 
part  will  explore  whether  the  leap  occured  in  specific  industries,  or  whether  it  was  a 
general  feature  of  the  economy.  In  the  conciusioa  we will discuss  a number  of further 
alternative  explanations. 
Any  analysis  of  the  World.  War  II period  will  be  piagued  by  a  lack  of  accurate 
data.  In  what  follows  we  will  draw  on  a variety  of sources  in  order  to  fill  in  gaps  and 
to  check  our  calculations.  The  most  reliable  data  come  from  the  National  Income 
and  Products  Accounts  (NIPA,  B.E.A.  ISW~I).  These  data  are  available  since  1929 
and  stocks  of  capital  from  the  Bureau  of  Economic  .4naiysis  (BE&  l3.E.~.  ~saab~) 
since  1925.  Unfortunatriy,  NIPA  does  not  allow  a  sectorial  disaggrecacion  for  the 
years  prior  to  World  War  II  (with  the  exception  of the  broad  decompositions  between 
IXTRO  D UCTIOX  1 Manufacturing  and  Yonmanufacturing  industries).  NIPA  data  for  the  whole  economy 
begins  ~JI 1929.  This  makes  a  comparison  between  the  1920s  and  the  post  depression 
years  impossible,  since  1929,  on  the  eve  of the  crash,  was  not  necessarily  representative 
of  the  decade  of  the  1920s.  For  these  reasons  we  also  utilize  data  from  the  IRS  Source 
Book  which  compile  balance  sheets  and  income  statements  for  corporitions  back 
to  1925  (with  some  changing  definitions).  Concerning  longer  historical  trends,  it  is 
necessary  to  resort  to  speciZlc  series  available  from  authoritative  studies  such  aa  that 
of  Raymond  Goldsmith  ( COLD_;MITH  R.W  1955) for  the  capital  stock,  and  Robert 
Gordon  (CORDON  R  138~) for  Gross  National  Product.  The  technical  description  of 
the  series  used  is  given  in  an  appendix  together  with  a  list  of  the  figures. 
I -  HISTORICAL  TRENDS 
The  remarkable  and  sustained  recovery  during  the  1940s  is  truly  an  anomaly 
when  compared  with  the  historical  trend.  In  order  to  illustrate  this  phenomenon, 
section  A  will  consider  the  long-term  trend  in  the  rate  of  pro6t  since  1869.  Section  B 
then  decomposes  this  rate  of  profit  into  the  share  of  profits  in  total  income  and  the 
output  to  capital  ratio  (what  we will  call  the  productivity  of  capital).  A third  section 
will  compare  our  long-term  profit  race  series  with  the  same  rate  of  profit  variable  for 
an  overlap  of  years,  as  a check  on  the  accuracy  of  our  data.  Finally,  we  will  consider 
the  impact  of  taxation  for  these  years. 
A  -  THE  RATE  OF  PROFIT  SINCE  1869 
In  a  previous  article  (DUM$NIL  G.. CLICK  M.. RANGEL  J.  1~8~) we  reviewed  the 
long-run  studies  of  profitability  and  found  those  of  Mage  and  Gillman  to  be  the 
longest  to  date.  Mage  begins  his  profit  rate  series  at  the  turn  of  the  century.  .41- 
though  Gillman  reports  data  back  to  the  1880s.  he  studies  only  the  manufacturing 
sector  and  his  data  displays  a  large  number  of  missing  years.  Recently  published  *;ata 
now  allow  for  the  calculation  of  the  race  of  profit  since  1869.  ‘To our  knowledge,  this 
is  the  first  presentation  of  profit  rate  data  for  such  a  comprehensive  span  of  years. 
Unfortunately,  due  to  the  lack  of  detailed  data,  our  long-term  measure,  like  Gillman 
and  Mage,  must  utilize  a  broad  definition  of  the  rate  of  profit.  Our  profit  variable 
includes  all  the  income  elements  except  wages.  In  particular,  indirect  business  taxes 
and  corporate  profit  taxes  are  included.  The  unit  of  analysis  (total  economy)  also  in- 
cludes  a  number  of  components  such  as  income  of  nonprofit  institutions,  other  private 
businesses  (rental  income  of  persons),  etc.,  which  should  ideally  be  deducted.  Similar 
computations  for  more  recent  years  show  that  the  inclusion  of  these  components  does 
not  affect  the  trend.  However,  we  provide  a  correction  for  the  wage  equivalent  of 
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Figure  1  -  The  Rate  of  Profit  (with  Wage-equivalent) 
GNP  (0)  and  Private  NNP  (0)  (lt369-1983) 
the  self-empioyed  (see  appendix),  since  their  diminishing  number  represent  a  more 
important  bias  in  these  meaurements. 
The  gross  national  product  (GNP)  is  available  from  a  recent  study  by  Gordon 
(GORDON  R. 136C).  From  this  series  we  also  compute  vPrivate  Net  National  Prod- 
uct”  (private  NNP).  Income  created  by  the  Government  is  deducted  from  GNP,  as 
well  as  depreciation.  The  stock  of  capital  is  from  Goldsmith  ( GOLDSMITH  R.W  ICISS 
and  CC?LDSMITH  E.W.  196s). In  the  early  years  the  increasing  salarisation  of  workers 
wbs  a  crucial  element  in  the  transformations  of  distribution.  We  ‘correct  for  this 
phenomenon  in  the  manner  explained  in  the  appendix  to  DVM~NIL  G.. LEVY  D. 1966. 
The  results  of  this  computation  are  presented  in  figure  1.  The  difference  in  the 
trend  of  the  two  measures  of  the  rate  of  profit,  especially  after  World  War  II,  is  the 
effect  of  the  increasing  weight  of  the  depreciation  of  fixed  capital  and  the  income 
generated  by  the  state.  Therefore,  the  ratio  built  with  Private  NNP  (0)  is  probably 
more  significant. 
Figure  1 reveals  chat  in  the  late  19th  century.  the  rate  of  profit  expresses  strong 
oscillations.  The  peak  around  1880  is  related  to  a  boom  in  GXP  (see  DYM~NIL  c 
LCV'I' D. 1966. figure  1).  The  rate  of  profit  then  plunges  into  the  ‘depression”  of  the 
1890s.  From  the  turn  of  the  century  to  the  Great  Depression,  the  trend  in  profitability 
HISTORICAL  TREXDS  3 is  flat.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  decade  of  the  1920s  does  not  corrcspoud  to 
a  surge  in  profitability,  as  has  been  often  contended,  but  instead  to  a  rather  low 
plateau,  below  the  average  of  the  previous  period.  Following  the  depression,  the 
‘leap  forward”  occurs  which  motivates  our  present  investigation.  After  World  War 
II,  profitability  reaches  new  heights.  The  features  (the  1960s  bulge  and  thedecline)  of 
this  later  period  are  well-known.  The  ‘leap  forward”  is  an  obvious  exceptional  event 
when  viewed  from  the  long-run  perspective  of  figure  1. 
In  both  cases,  the  World  War  II  leap  forward  appears  as  an  unprecedented  re- 
covery,  and  the  high  levels  are  maintained  for  more  than  20  years,  indicating  that  this 
recovery  is  not  the  expression  of  higher  levels  of  capacity  utilization. 
B  -  THE  SHARE  OF  PROFITS  IN  NATIONAL  INCOME  AND  THE 
PRODUCTWITY  OF  CAPITAL 
In  order  to  gain  further  insight  in  the  puzzling  occurence  of  the  leap,  it  is  often 
helpful  to  decompose  the  rate  of  profit  bs  the  product  of  the 
productivity  of  capital: 
Profits  output 
Prolt  rate  =  -  x  - 
Output  Capital 
The  results  of this  decomposition  are  presented  in  figures 
are  those  used  in  figure  1. 
Figure  2 .shows  that  the  long-term  trend  in  the  profit 
share  of  profits  and  the 
2 and  3.  The  definitions 
share  is  upward.  This 
corresponds  with  .Marx’s  prediction  of  a  long-term  rising  race  of  surplus  value.  In 
addition,  it  is  clear  that  the  fluctuations  in  the  rate  of  profit  are  mainly  the  result 
of  fluctuations  in  the  profit  share.  The  movement  of  the  profit  share  explains  about 
one  half  of  the  leap  forward.  Figure  3  shows  that  the  second  half  of  the  leap  forward 
can  be  attributed  to  changes  in  the  productivity  of  capital.  Productivity  decreased 
steadily,  in  spite  of  important  fluctuations,  until  World  War  I,  again  in  concert  with 
Marx’s  hypothesis.  A  timid  recovery  was  initiated  during  the  1920s  and,  then,  the 
leap  upward  occured  (from  about  .45  to  .55)  during  the  war. 
C -  THE  RATE  OF  PROFIT  SINCE  THE  LATE  1920s 
In  order  to  check  the  reliability  of  our  previous  long-run  measure  of  the  rate  of 
profit,  we  compare  it  in  this  section  with  data  from  the  ?iational  Accounts  for  the 
overlap  period  of  1929-1983:  We  define  our  NIPA  rate  of  profit  in  the  following-way: 
-‘Vet ProlEts  before  all  Taxes 
Stock  of  Fixed  Capital  Set  of  Depreciation 
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Figure  2 -  The  Share  of  Profit0  (with  Wage-equivalent) 
GNP  (0)  and  Private  NNP  (0)  (18641983) 












0.00  I,,,,,,  ,,:.,., 
1860  1870  1880  1890  19&J  1910  19'9  1930  1940  1950  li60  1970  1980Year 
Figure  3  -  The Productivity  of  Capital 
GNP  (0)  and  Private  NNP  (0)  (1869-198s) 
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Figure  4  -  The  Rate  of  Profit 
from  NIPA-BEA  (0  19241985)  and  as  in  Figure  1 (o  1929-1979) 
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Figure  5  -  The  Productivity  of  Capital 
from  NIPA-BEA  (o  1929-1986)  and  as  in  Figure  3  (c  1929-1979) 
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Figure  6  -  The  Rate  of  Profit  from  NIPA-BEA  (Corporate  and  SPP)  :  Pro&e  over 
Nit  (as  in  Figure  4  l  )  and  Gross  (0)  Capital,  Net  plus  Inventories  (w) (1929-1985) 
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Figure  7  -  The  Rate  of  Profit  from  IRS  (Corporate)  :  Profits  over 
Net  Capital  (*  1925-1970)  and  Equities  (c  19261970) 
HISTORICAL  TREiVDS  7 In  addition.  the  following  is  of  note  : 
1.  The  unit  of  analysis  is  limited  to  the  Corporate  Sector  and  Sole  Proprietorships 
and  Partnerships  (SPP).  Dubious  components  have  been  eliminated  for  from 
capital  and  profits  (see  the  appendix  to  this  study). 
2.  A  wage-equivalent  is  constructed  for  the  self-employed  (a  different  rate  of  wages 
is  computed  for  each  industry). 
3.  The  stock  of  capital  includes  both  residential  and  nonresidential  components, 
and  Government  Owned  Privately  Operated  Capital. 
This  rate  of  profit  is  displayed  in  figure  4.  On  the  basis  of  this  computation,  the 
leap  is  still  apparent  and  its  amplisude  is  similar  to  what  we  found  earlier.  The  same 
observation  can  be  mada  in  figure  5 for  the  productivity  of  capital.  The  difference  in 
levels  for  both  computations  is  the  effect  of  the  different  definitions  (for  example,  the 
inclusion  of  net  interest,  the  measure  of  fixed  capital,  etc.). 
With  the  exception  of  the  effect  of  taxation,  which  wiIl  be  considered  below,  the 
leap  forward  survives  any  change  in  profit  rate  definition.  In  figure  6,  three  variants 
on  the  stock  of  capital  (gross  capital,  net  capital,  net  capital  plus  inventories)  are 
displayed  which  again  yield  the  same  result. 
Our  profile  of  the  rate  of  profit  can  be  further  checked  by  a  comparison  with  data 
taken  from  the  actual  reported  balance  sheet  and  income  statements  of corporate  firms 
taken  from  the  IRS  Source  Book  of  Statistics.  This  data  is  available  from  1925.  The 
IRS  data  source  also  allows  the  consideration  of  different  definitions  of  the  rate  of 
profit.  Two  such  rates  are  displayed  in  figure  7:  profits  net  of  indirect  business  taxes 
and  depreciation  over  net  fixed  capital  or  Equity.  Again  the  reported  movement  is 
similar  to  the  one  observed  above.  In  addition,  the  rates  of  profit  built  from  the  IRS 
data  reveal  that  1929  is  not  an  exceptional  starting  point,  but  reflects  the  fact  it  is 
an  average  year  of  profitability.  (The  series  starts  in  1925,  a  peak  year  in  the  1920s 
from  the  point  of  view  of  profitability.) 
Our  long-run  data  with  the  leap  forward  survives  every  comparison  with  more 
well-known  data  sources.  The  leap  forward  similarly  survives  both  changing  data  sets 
and  various  definitions.  Thus.  this  anomaly  in  the  historical  evolution  of  profitability 
must  be  taken  seriously  and  cannot  be  ignored  in  future  research. 
D  -  THE  IMPACT  OF  TAXATION 
One  important  aspect  of  the  leap  forward  in  profitability  is  that  it  is  completely 
absorbed  by  the  state  through  taxation.  In  order  to  investigate  this  phenomenon. 
the  unit  of  analysis  must  be  restricted  to  the  corporate  sector  (now  80  percent  of 
total  economy).  tor  which  both  indirect  business  taxes  and  corporate  pro6ts  cues  are 
available  and  can  be  separately  investigated. 




Figure 8 -  The  Rate  of Proflt  from  NIPA-BEA  (Corporate)  :  Profits  Including 
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Figure  9 -  Shares of Taxes  in Total  Income: 
Ind.  Business  Taxes  (a),  Corporate  Prof.  Taxes  (o), Both  Taxes  (w) (19291985) 
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Figure  10  -  The  Rate  of Profit  from IRS  (Corporate)  :  Proflto  before 
Corporate  Prof.  Taxer  (0)  and  after  all  Taxes  (c  (1926-1970) 
Figure  8 displays  the  profile  of  the  race  of  profit.  for  a  definition  of  profits  includ- 
ing  all  taxes  (indirect  business  twes  plus  corporate  profits  taxes).  After  deduction 
of  indirect  business  taxes  the  leap  is  already  eroded.  If  profits  after  all  taxes  are 
considered,  the  leap  is  offset  totally. 
In  order  to  assess  the  relative  impact  of  the  two  types  of  taxes.  we  compute  the 
share  of  taxes  in  total  income.  The  result  of  this  computation  is  dispiayed  in  figure 
9.  Consider,  first,  indirect  business  t-s.  If one  abstracts  from  the  rise  of  the  actual 
rate  of  taxation  during  the  Depression,  this  rate  is  increased,  from  1929  to  the  post- 
World  War  II  years,  from  about  7 percent  to  13 percent.  Subsequently,  the  ratio  is 
stable  up  to  the  present  period.  Consider  next  corporate  profits  t;Lxes.  Abstracting 
from  World  War  II.  the  rise  from  1929  to  the  aftermath  of  the  war,  is  dramatic:  2 
or  3 percent  compared  to  10  percent.  In  the  postwar  years  there  is  a  steady  decrease 
which  continues  into  the  present  (3 or  4  percent). 
Another  important  feature  of  the  period  under  consideration  is.  thus,  that  the 
share  in  the  improvement  of  profitability  absordcd  by  the  state  during  World  War 
II  haj  &en  steadily  deweAsed  throughout  the  30  years  following  the  war,  since  the 
1950s.  From  the  mid-1960s  onward,  this  relaxation  of  the  tax  burden  has  as  acted 
as  a  powerful  countertendency  to  the  falling  rate  of  profit  (from  the  point  of  view  of 
enterprises). .4  similar  picture  can  be  obtained  from  IRS  series,  with  respect  to  corporate 
profits  taxes  (cf.  figure  :O).  After  corporate  profits  taxes,  the  leap  is  approximately 
offset. 
The  leap  forward  in  profitability  and  the  high  levels  of  taxation  impbscd  by  the 
Roosevelt  administration  financed  the  huge  rise  in  state  expenditures  which  accompa- 
nied  the  prosperity  of  the  immediate  postwar  years.  Without  both  the  rise  in  profits 
and  their  distribution  to  the  state  the  rise  in  state  activities  could  not  have  been 
possible. 
These  historical  facts  regarding  taxation  do  not  explain  the  origin  of  the  leap 
forward,  but  only  the  distribution  of  these  profits.  In  the  following  section  we  will 
consider  two  competing  explanations  of  the  origin  of  the  recovery. 
II  -  TWO  COMPETING  EXPLANATIONS 
In  this  part,  we  consider  two  possible  explanations  of  the  leap  forward  :  changes 
in  the  relative  price  of  fixed  capital  (section  .4)  and  the  increase  in  the  workweek 
of  capital  (section  B).  We  do  not  believe  these  are  the  only  possible  explanations, 
instead,  they  are  hypotheses  often  suggested  as  responsible  for  movements  in  the  rate 
of  profit.  As  we  shall  explain,  they  cannot  account  for  the  leap  fomard. 
A  -  NOMINAL  AND  REAL  EFFECTS 
It  is  often  contended  by  Marxists  that  changes  in  the  productivity  of  capital 
result  from  a  fall  in  the  relative  price  of  fixed  capital  (an  important  countertendency 
listed  by  Marx).  This  is  not  the  fact  situation  of  the  leap  forward. 
In  figure  11,  the  relative  price  of  capital  as  compared  to  GNP  is  plotted.  From 
1869  to  1925,  only  the  ratio  of the  investment  deflator  to  the  GNP  deflator  is  available. 
After  1925,  it  is  also  possible  to  compute  the  relative  price  of  the  stock  of  capital. 
The  two  ratios  reveal  the  same  upward  trend.  The  rise  of  the  price  of  capital  goods 
has  always  been  steeper  than  that  of  GNP,  the  reverse  of  the  expected  pattern.  .4nd 
in  spite  of  important  fluctuations,  no  rupture  can  be  located  during  World’  War  II. 
When  the  productivity  of  capital  is  measured  in  real  terms  (deflated  numerator  and 
denominator)  in  Figure  12,  the  leap  forward  becomes  even  more  pronounced  ! 
The  !vIarxist  literature  rarely  refers  to  the  productivity  of  capital  (a  term  we  use 
for  its  recognition  by  economists)  but  instead  to  a less  discussed  variable  :  the  “organic 
composition”  of capital.  In  -Marxist  terms  it  is  the  ratio  of constant  to  variable  capital. 
Marx’s  presentation.  in  Volume  III,  however,  assumes  a  flow  model  instead  of  a  stock 
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Figure  11  -  Relative  Price  of  Capital  (0)  and  Investment  (0) 
(1925-1985  (o),  18641986  (0)) 
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Figure  12  -  Productivity  of  Capital  in  Real  Terms  (Private  NNP) 
Deflators  and  Periods  as  in  Figure  11. 
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Figure  14  -  Average  Weekly  Hours  of  Fixed  Capital 
Total  Nonfarm  Business  (1929-1976) 
TWO  COMPETLVC  EXPLANATZ0,Y.S  13 model.  M  suggested  by  his  analysis  in  Volume  II.  Thus,  it  is  commonly  held  that 
the  organic  composition  should  be  me;uured  as  the  ratio  of  i5xed  capital  in  constant 
dollars  to  the  total  stock  of  employment  corrected  by  the  duration  of  labor,  i.e.,  the 
amount  of  labor.’  This  ratio  is  measured  in  real  terms. 
This  stock  based  measure  of  the  organic  composition  of  capital  is  d&played  in 
figure  13.  The  difference  in  the  trends  before  and  after  World  War  II  is  striking.  The 
rupture  corresponding  to  the  leap  forward  in  profitability  is  again  apparent,  during 
the  war. 
B  -  THE  WORKWEEK  OF  CAPITAL 
-4 second  possible  explanation  for  the  leap  forward  in  profitability  is  an  increased 
utilization  of  fixed  capital  due  to  the  extension  of  the  workweek  of  fixed  capital.  A 
series  of  average  weekly  hours  of  fixed  capital  use  has  recently  been  made  available 
by  Murray  Foss  ( FQSS M.  19tl4, Table  1.  page  8).  This  series  is  plotted  in  figure 
14.  Although  a  steady  trend  upward  is  observable  in  this  figure,  no  leap  upward  is 
revealed  during  World  War  II.  Although  Foss  did  not  have  explicit  data  for  the  war 
years  and  extrapolated  from  the  available  data  before  and  after  the  war,  the  existing 
data  show  that  the  size  of  changes  in  the  utilization  of  6xed  capital  is  not  sufficient 
to  account  for  a  phenomenon  the  scale  of  the  leap  forward. 
The  increased  workweek  of capital  accounts  for  a  rise  of  about  only  10 percent  of 
the  historical  trend  of  the  productivity  of  capital  between  1929  and  1976.  Thus,  other 
economic  phenomena  account  for  a  much  more  important  share  of  the  leap  forward. 
III  -  AN  ANALYSIS  BY  INDUSTRY 
In  this  section  we  attempt  to  more  specifically  locate  the  sectoriai  source  of  the 
recovery.  Using  the  NIPA  data  base  we  can  only  distinguish  between  manufacturing 
and  nonmanufacturing  sectors.  The  investigation  of  the  difference  between  these  two 
sectors  will  be  the  object  of  section  A  below.  However,  on  the 
possible  to  make  a  finer  analysis  by  decomposing  the  economy 
wiIl  be  presented  in  section  B. 
bask  of  IRS  data.  it  is 
into  8  industries.  This 
‘In  the  flow  model  total  value  ZJ  drvided  info  the  components  c  -  v  -  P,  In  the  stock 
model,  rntroduced  tn  Volume  II  of  Capita,  thrs  Jou:  approach  13  combrned  wtth  the 
view  that.  at  a  qrven  Instant,  capital  eztsts  under  the  three  forms  of,  P,  ptoducttvc 
caprtal,  C,  commodaty  caprtal,  and,  .U,,  money  caprtal.  In  the  flotv  model?  the  organrc 
composltton  of  caprtai  a3  deJ?ned  as  c;v,  and  tn  the  stock  model,  IL  can  be  measured 
a3  Productive  capital.  Total  stock  of  employment. 
A.+? ANALYSIS  BY  LVDI’STRY  14 A - MANUFACTURING  AND  NONMANUFACTURING  INDUSTRIES 
Figure  15  displays  the  rate  of  profit  for  both  the  manufacturing  and  the  non- 
manufacturing  sectors.  Profits  are  calculated  after  indirect  business  taxes,and  net  of 
depreciation.  A  correction  for  the  wage-equivalent  of  self-employed  has  been  made. 
The  difference  between  Manufacturing  and  Nonmanufacturing  industries  is  striking. 
In  1929,  the  rate  of  profit  within  Manufacturing  is  about  40  percent  whereas,  outside, 
of  Manufacturing,  it  is  below  10  percent  !  In  the  1950s  the  gap  is  still  dramatic.  It  is 
then  gradually  reduced  to  the  present.  In  addition,  three  further  observations  should 
be  made: 
1.  There  is  no  leap  forward  in  profitability  for  Manufacturing  industries,  only  a 
bulge  during  World  War  II.  The  rate  of  profit  in  1929  is  greater  than  the  average 
rates  for  the  eariy  post-World  War  II  years. 
2.  As  we  already  observed,  the  World  War  II  leap  forward  is  reduced  when  prof- 
its  after  indirect  business  taxes  are  considered.  But  it  is  still  evident  within 
Nonmanufacturing  industries. 
3.  Further  computations  not  presented  here  show  that  dificrent  definitions  of  the 
rate  of  profit  yield  the  same  result  (for  example,  using  historical  cost  of  6xed 
capital]. 
We  consider  now  the  same  decomposition  using  IRS  data  base.  The  results  are 
presented  in  figure  16.  Here  we  find  a  discrepancy  between  the  results  we  obtain  from 
the  IRS  data  base  and  the  SIPA  data  base.  As  figure  16  illustrates,  in  the  IRS  dat’a 
base,  the  leap  forward  appears  in  both  manufacturing  and  nonmanufacturing.  This 
is  a  result  of  the  high  level  of  reported  profit  in  manufacturing  in  the  NIP.4  data  base 
compared  to  the  IRS  data  base. 
It  is  evident  that  the  definitions  of  the  rate  of  profit  in  the  two  data  bases  are 
different.  In  particular,  the  stock  of  capital  in  IRS  series  is  measured  on  an  histor- 
ical  basis.  Nevertheless,  this  difference  alone  could  not  account  for  the  real  lack  of 
consistency  between  the  two  sources. 
To  further  this  investigation  we  compare  separately  the  profit  and  capital  series  in 
the  two  data  sources  (NIPA-BEA  and  IRS).  Profits  are  always  measured  after  indirect 
business  taxes.  Capital  is  defined  as  net  capital  at  historical  cost.  The  results  of  these 
computations  are  presented  in  figures  18  and  19.  It  is  clear  from  figure  18  that  the 
difference  observed  are  not,  the  expression  of  divergent  measures  of  profits.  In  1929, 
the  ratio  of  the  t,wo  profit  series  is  equal  to  about  1.25.  This  value  is  similar  or 
even  greater  than  those  obtained  after  World  War  II.  The  divergence  between  the 
two  measures  of  profit  cannot  account  for  the  higher  profitability  in  1929  obtained  in 
the  SIPA-BEA  series.  Conververly.  figure  19.  vividly  shows  that  the  measures  of  the 
capital  stock  differ  markedly.  The  value  of  the  stock  of  capital  at  historical  cost,  and 
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Figure  15 -  The  Rate  of  Profit  on  Fixed  Capital  &om  NIPA-BEA 
Manufacturing  and  Nonmanufacturing  Industries  (19291985) 
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Figure  16  -  The  Rate  of  Proflt  on  Fixed  Capital  from  IRS 
Manufacturing  and  Nonmanufacturing  Industries  (1925-1970) 
1 
e 0.10 1 
-0.05  J 
l&5 
I  I  I  1  1  I  I 
1930  1935  1940  1945  1950  1955  1960  1965  19’70  Year 
Figbre  17  -  The  Rate  of  Profit  on  Equities  from  IRS 
Manufacturing  and  Nonmanufacturing  Industries  (192&1970) 
1960s  the  ratio  fluctuates  between  .80  and  .85.  However,  the  striking  observation  iz 
that  this  ratio  was  equal  to  .50  in  1929.  Thus!  the  divergent  measurements  of  capital 
within  the  two  data  set  is  at  the  origin  of  the  different  assessments  of  the  race  of pro6t 
in  1929. 
Independently  of  the  source  used.  the  gap  between  the  rate  of  profit  in  iMan- 
ufacturing  and  the  ocher  sectors  is  puzzling.  A  portion  of  this  difference  is  due  to 
the  measure  of  capital  used  in  the  definitions  of  the  race  of  profit.  We  know  from 
previous  research  (cf.  CLICK  M. lo&.)  that  rates  of  profit  measured  on  equity  are 
more  equalized  between  industries  than  races  of return  measured  on  the  stock  of  fixed 
capital. 
The  value  of  equity  is  available  from  IRS  data.  The  rates  of  profit  for  Manu- 
facturing  and  Nonmanufacturing  using  a  measure  of  the  race  of  profit  on  equity  is 
displayed  in  figure  17.  The  difference  between  the  two  sectors  is  considerably  reduced. 
but  the  leap  forward  in  profitability  is  still  apparent  for  both  sectors. 
B  -  EIGHT  IIWUSTRIES  (IRS)  - 
Using  IRS  data.  it  is  pnsgible  to  breakdown  the  Nonmanufacturing  sector  of 
AS  ASALYs’lS  BY  LVDC’STRY 
the 
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Figure  18  -  Ratio  of  two  Measures  of  Prodts:  NIPA-BLS/JRS 
Pro5te  after  Ind.  Business  Taxes,  Manufacturing  (1929-1970) 
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Figure  19  -  Ratio  of  two  Measures  of  Capital:  NIPA-ELS/TRS 
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Figure  20  -  The  Rate  of Pro&  from  IRS : 
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Figure 21  -  The  Rate  of Profit from  IRS : 
Services  (*),  Finance  (o),  Construction  (w), Agriculture  (x)  (rxts-197o) 
AN ANALYSIS  BY  INDI-STRY  19 present  in  every  measure  of  the  race  of  profit  (before  taxes)  that  we  have  calculated, 
and  it  is  not  confined  to  a  specific  industry  or  group  of  industries.  Rather,  it  is 
common  to  every  economic  sector,  with  the  exception  of  the  manufacturing  sector  in 
the  NIPA  data  base. 
The  explanation  for  this  phenomenon  has  been  elusive.  In  this  study  it  has  been 
shown  that  two  plausible  explanations  are  not  satisfactory.  First,  the  leap  is  not  the 
effect  of  a  change  in  relative  prices.  Jn  real  terms,  the  recovery  during  the  war  is 
further  exaggerated.  Second,  the  leap  forward  U not  the  effect  of  the  extension  of  the 
workweek  of  capital. 
In  both  the  Marxian  and  the  Keynesian  literature  on  macroeconomics  the  rela- 
tively  high  levels  of  profitability  after  World  War  II  have  been  occasrionally  referred 
to,  but  ndt  in  the  context  of  a  secular  trend.  However,  the  explanations  usually  hinge 
on  thee  types  of  mechanisms  :  competition,  demand,  and  imperialism.  For  example  : 
Paul  Baran  and  Paul  Sweezy  in  their  study  on  Monopoly  Capita&m  ( BARAN 
P..  SWEEZY  P  ~QGG) contended  that  Marx’s  law  of  the  tendency  for  the  rate  of 
profit  to  fall  was  only  characteristic  of  the  competitive  stage  of  capitalism.  Under 
monoploy  capitalism  a  converse  law  of  the  increase  of  the  surplus  was  at  work. 
The  idea  that  a  high  level  of  demand  resulted  in  an  increased  profitability  haa 
been  defended  in  various  contexts.  Emphasis  is  often  placed  on  the  demand  side 
effect  of  stat.e  expenditures  or  on  the  rules  which  govern  the  formation  of  wages.’ 
The  third  group  of  explanations  refer  to  the  possible  effect  of  transfers  of  surplus 
value  from  abroad  through  the  mechanisms  of  imperialism.  Transfers  of  surplus 
value  can  correspond  to  the  terms  of  exchange  on  imports  and  exports.  or  to  the 
export  of  capital. 
We  do  not  consider  any  of  these  traditional  explanations  to  be  fruitful  avenues 
of  future  research.  Concerning  the  Monopoly  Capital  explanation,  there  is  no  reason 
based  on  this  approach  co  expect  a  concentrated  leap  forward  at  the  end  of  the 
depression.  Even  if  there  was  a  rise  in  monopoly,  in  our  opinion,  such  a  rise  would 
only  change  the  distribution  of  total  profit  and  could  not  increase  its  total  mas. 
Concerning  demand,  it  is  certainly  true  that  it  is  an  important  factor  in  determining 
profitability.  However,  the  leap  forward  was  not  a  demand  determined  phenomenon. 
Although  there  was  a rise  in  capacity  utilization  during  the  war,  after  the  war  the  high 
profitability  ws  maintained  despite  a return  to  normal  usage  of  capacity  utilization 
(Le.,  80  percent).  Finally,  although  international  transfers  certainly  play  a role  in  the 
evolution  of  profitability  in  the  United  States,  the  size  of  these  effects  does  not  appear 
’  The  concept  of  “Fordism”  in  the  analyses  of  the  Rcqufatron  School  (AGLIETTA  .u 
1976, B?YER  p..  ?.I!.-‘TP,AL  :.  1073, and  LIPIETZ  A.  19%)  has  been  cnttcstcd  an  D'.TMONIL 
\‘...  L$VY  D. 1036.  However,  one  can  remark  here  that  thu  type  of  ezpianation  does 
not  reaily  address  the  tssue  of  the  leap,  a  phenomenon  whrch  occured  tn  a  few  years 
dunnq  the  war. 
CONCL  lLsION  21 present  in  every  measure  of  the  rate  of  profit  (before  taxes)  that  we  have  calculated, 
and  it  is  not  confined  to  a  specific  industry  or group  of  industries.  Rather,  it  is 
common  to  every  economic  sector,  with  the  exception  of  the  manufacturing  sector  in 
the  NIPA  data  base. 
The  explanation  for  this  phenomenon  has  been  elusive.  In  this  study  it  has  been 
shown  that  two  plausible  expianations  are  not  satisfactory.  First,  the  leap  is  not  the 
effect  of  a  change  in  relative  prices.  Jn  real  terms,  the  recovery  during  the  war  is 
further  exaggerated.  Second,  the  leap  forward  is  not  the  effect  of  the  extension  of  the 
workweek  of  capital. 
In  both  the  Marxian  and  the  Keynesian  literature  on  macroeconomics  the  rela- 
tively  high  levels  of  profitability  after  World  War  II  have  been  occasrionally  referred 
to,  but  n&  in  the  context  of  a  secular  trend.  However,  the  explanations  usually  hinge 
on  three  types  of  mechanisms  :  competition,  demand,  and  imperialism.  For  example  : 
Paul  Baran  and  Paul  Sweezy  in  their  study  on  Monopoly  Capita&m  ( BARAN 
P..  SWEEZY  P.  lxx) contended  that  Marx’s  law  of  the  tendency  for  the  rate  of 
profit  to  fall  was  only  characteristic  of  the  competitive  stage  of  capitalism.  Under 
monoploy  capitalism  a  converse  law  of  the  increase  of  the  surplus  was  at  work. 
The  idea  that  a  high  level  of  demand  resulted  in  an  increased  profitability  has 
been  defended  in  various  contexts.  Emphasis  is  often  placed  on  the  demand  side 
effect  of  state  expenditures  or  on  the  rules  which  govern  the  formation  of  wages.’ 
The  third  group  of  explanations  refer  to  the  possible  effect  of  transfers  of  surplus 
value  from  abroad  through  the  mechanisms  of  imperialism.  Transfers  of  surplus 
value  can  correspond  to  the  terms  of  exchange  on  imports  and  exports,  or  to  the 
export  of  capital. 
We  do  not  consider  any  of  these  traditional  explanations  to  be  fruitful  avenues 
of  future  research.  Concerning  the  Monopoly  Capital  explanation,  there  is  no  reason 
based  on  this  approach  co  expect  a  concentrated  leap  forward  at  the  end  of  the 
depression.  Even  if  there  was  a  rise  in  monopoly,  in  our  opinion,  such  a  rise  would 
only  change  the  distribution  of  total  profit  and  could  not  increase  its  total  mass. 
Concerning  demand,  it  is  certainly  true  that  it  is  an  important  factor  in  determining 
profitability.  However,  the  leap  forward  wa  not  a  demand  determined  phenomenon. 
Although  there  was  a rise  in  capacity  utilization  during  the  war,  after  the  war  the  high 
profitability  was  maintained  despite  a  return  to  normal  usage  of  capacity  utilization 
(i.e.,  80  percent).  Finally,  although  international  transfers  certainly  play  a  role  iu  the 
evolution  of  profitability  in  the  United  States,  the  size  of  these  effects  does  not  appear 
? The  concept  of  “Fordism”  in  the  analyses  of  the  Rcqulatton  School  (AGLIETTA  Y. 
1976,  BQYEI? P...  .\.f!.'TP..\L  : 1973,  and  LIPIETZ A.  19:9)  has  been  cnttclzcdrn  DF&NIL 
c:..  LkVY  D  1933. However,  one  can  nm.ark  here  that  thas  type  of  etpianation  does 
not  really  address  the  ISSUE  oj  the  leap,  a  phenomenon  whrch  occured  In  a  jew  years 
dunnq  the  war. to  bt  significant  enough  to  account  for  such  a  sudden  and  drastic  transformation  as 
the  leap  forward  that  we  have  described. 
In  our  view,  future  research  should  focus  on  the  utilization  of capital,  but  not  in 
the  sense  of firm  capacity  utilization.  Utilization  of capital  refers  here to  the  structural 
ability  of  6mu  to  obtain  a certain  output  on  the  basis  of  a given  stock  of capital.  This 
ability  is  a reflection  of  a complex  set  of  technological,  organizational,  and  managerial 
mechanisms.  The  empirical  evidence  we  have  suggests  the  following  ptriodization  of 
these  structural  factors  : 
The  productivity  of  capital  clearly  decreased  until  1900  (cf.  figure  3),  while  the 
growth  of  business  investment  to  GNP  was  interrupted  at  the  same  time.  A  first 
rupture  occurred  at  the  turn  of  the  century. 
A  second  period  contains  the  turn  of  the  century  up  to  World  War  II,  during 
which  there  was  a  rather  stable  productivity  of  capital. 
Finally,  during  World  War  II,  a  set  of  specific  political  and  economic  conditions 
allowed  new  achievements  in  output  to  take  place.  State  planning  sought  the 
elimination  of  idle  capacity  throughout  the  economy.  For  several  years,  the  r&s 
which  under  ordinary  circumstances  (costs,  uncertainty  with  ruptct  to  demand, 
ttc),  restrain  the  utilization  of  capacity  to  normal  levels below  100  percent  were 
transformed.  Production  was  only  limited  by  the  mere  physical  avaiiability  of 
resources. 
Future  research  is  certainly  necessary  to  more  fully  understand  the  mechanisms 
which  underlie  the  recovery  of  profitability.  We  have  tried  to  offer  some  guidance  in 
this  conclusion  as  to  where  we  believe  further  investigation  would  be  most  fruitful. 
The  main  contribution  of  this  paper  has  been  to  expose  the  dimensions  and  charac- 
teristics  of  the  recovery  of  profitability  in  the  World  War  II  years  and  after.  This 
phenomenon  has  critical  importance  for  any  analysis  of  long-run  secular  trends  in  the 
U.S.  rate  of  profit,  yet  it  has  surprisingly  evaded  attention  until  now. 
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